The Pro-Fatimid Conspiracy Against Saladin

An Intrigue in Cairo: 1173-1174

In the shadowy corridors of political power in Cairo, between 1173 and 1174, a clandestine conspiracy unfolded. It aimed at reviving the Isma'ili Shi'a Fatimid Caliphate, which had met its demise in 1171 when Saladin, the first ruler of the Ayyubid dynasty, took control. This plot, shrouded in mystery and recorded only by sources favorable to Saladin, was orchestrated by the remnants of the Fatimid elite. Their ambition was to reclaim Cairo by exploiting Saladin's absence, as he was engaged in military campaigns.

The conspirators allegedly reached out to the Crusaders of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, inviting them to invade Egypt and draw Saladin away. They are also rumored to have contacted the Nizari Isma'ili Order, known as the Assassins, in a bid to eliminate Saladin. However, modern historians question these claims, suggesting they may have been fabricated to tarnish the reputations of the conspirators. Ultimately, the conspiracy was betrayed to Saladin. Some sources even propose that Saladin himself engineered the conspiracy as a political purge or as a stratagem to demonstrate to his wary superior, Nur al-Din Zengi, the emir of Aleppo and Damascus, that Egypt was still turbulent and needed his firm hand to maintain order.

On March 31, 1174, Saladin struck decisively, arresting the ringleaders, including the renowned poet Umara al-Yamani. From April 6 to May 23, the chief conspirators were executed in the Bayn al-Qasrayn square, while others faced exile. A subsequent pro-Fatimid revolt in Upper Egypt was swiftly suppressed in September by Saladin's brother, al-Adil.

Background: The Rise and Fall of the Fatimid Caliphate

The Fatimid Caliphate was a formidable Islamic empire from 909 to 1171, spanning North Africa, the Levant, and the western Arabian Peninsula. Originating in Ifriqiya, it established Cairo as its capital after conquering Egypt in 969. The Fatimid caliphs wielded both secular and religious authority as the imams of Isma'ili Shi'ism, presiding over an intricate religious missionary network known as the da'wa. However, by the 1060s and 1070s, internal strife nearly toppled the Fatimid state. The vizier Badr al-Jamali restored central authority, instituting a de facto military dictatorship where the caliphs were stripped of power, with the last three ascending the throne as mere children.

In the 1160s, the Fatimid state was reduced to Egypt, beset by Crusader invasions from the Kingdom of Jerusalem and internal discord. The Sunni ruler of Syria, Nur al-Din Zengi, intervened by sending his general Shirkuh into Egypt. Following complex political and military maneuvers, Shirkuh was appointed vizier by the Fatimid caliph al-Adid in January 1169. Upon Shirkuh's untimely death, his nephew Saladin was selected as a compromise candidate to succeed him.

Saladin found himself in a precarious position: a Sunni leading a Sunni army in a dominantly Shi'a state, under the watchful eye of Nur al-Din, a known Sunni champion against the Isma'ilis. Saladin's intent to dismantle the Fatimid regime was clear, provoking opposition from Fatimid factions, particularly those entrenched in the palace. Despite an initial accommodation with Caliph al-Adid to secure his position, this move displeased Nur al-Din, who distrusted Saladin's motives and refused to acknowledge his authority.

Saladin gradually weakened the Fatimid Caliphate by incorporating Nur al-Din's name in the Friday prayer alongside that of Caliph al-Adid, thereby marginalizing the latter. He bolstered his Syrian troops by allocating military fiefs (iqta') for their maintenance, withdrawing similar privileges from Fatimid commanders. This stirred the Fatimid elites to action, leading to a conspiracy spearheaded by the majordomo Mu'tamin al-Khilafa. Medieval chroniclers claim Mu'tamin encouraged the Crusaders to invade Egypt, hoping to force Saladin to abandon Cairo and enabling Mu'tamin and his supporters to seize the capital.

Modern historians, however, remain skeptical about these accounts, suggesting they were fabricated to justify Saladin's crackdown on pro-Fatimid elements. Mu'tamin was captured and executed as the supposed leader of the conspiracy, sparking a revolt by the Fatimid army's African and Armenian troops in Cairo from August 21 to 23, 1169. This insurrection was brutally suppressed, with Saladin's brother Turan-Shah leading a massacre of loyalist black African troops.

With the Fatimid military neutralized and a Crusader assault on Damietta repelled, Saladin's rule over Egypt was solidified. He installed his family and followers in key civil and military positions, paving the way for a final assault on the Fatimid regime. Public expressions of the Isma'ili creed were abolished, and Sunnis replaced Isma'ilis in all judicial offices, including that of the chief qadi. Surviving Fatimid troops retreated to Upper Egypt, launching sporadic uprisings with little success. On September 10, 1171, the Sunni Abbasid caliph al-Mustadi's name replaced al-Adid's in Friday prayers, marking the end of the Fatimid regime. Al-Adid's death on September 13, 1171, following a brief illness, only confirmed its downfall. The Isma'ili community faced persecution under Saladin's new Ayyubid regime, and members of the Fatimid family were imprisoned in the Cairo Citadel.

The Conspiracy Unfolds

In the years following the Fatimid Caliphate's fall, Cairo's surviving Fatimid elite orchestrated a conspiracy against Saladin. This cabal included the Isma'ili missionary and former chief qadi, Hibatallah ibn Kamil al-Mufaddal, the last Fatimid chief da'i, Abd al-Jabbar al-Jalis, and former chief qadi al-Hasan al-Uwairis. Also involved were senior secretary Shubruma, military commander Abd al-Samad al-Qashsha, the head of Fatimid sympathizers in Alexandria, Qadid al-Qafas, and the celebrated Yemeni poet Umara al-Yamani, who continued to lament the Fatimid dynasty's demise through his poetry.

The conspiracy's goals remain debated. According to a report by Saladin's chief secretary, Qadi al-Fadil, which was later echoed by 13th-century historians Ibn Abi Tayyi and Abu Shama, the conspirators sought an alliance with the Crusaders. Saladin's regime purportedly employed Ibn Qarjalah, who had previously aided the Crusaders in their 1169 invasion, to communicate with King Amalric of Jerusalem. Amalric reportedly dispatched a courtier named George to Cairo under the guise of negotiating with Saladin, but with the true aim of meeting with the conspirators and former Fatimid officials absorbed by the new regime. The plan involved Amalric launching a campaign against Saladin in the Levant or along Egypt's Mediterranean coast, similar to the 1169 Damietta operation. This would compel Saladin to mobilize his army away from Cairo. During the harvest season, when troops dispersed to their fiefs, the conspirators planned to rally remnants of the Fatimid army, palace personnel, and sympathizers to seize control of Cairo.

In contrast, the contemporary scholar Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, as quoted by al-Bundari, omits any Crusader contacts, while Ibn Khallikan's account, also based on Imad al-Din, asserts they did occur. Qadi al-Fadil also alleged that the conspirators approached Sinan, the leader of the Nizari Order of Assassins in Syria, to assassinate Saladin. The Assassins indeed attempted three unsuccessful assassinations on Saladin in December 1174/January 1175, May 1176, and June 1176, prompting Saladin to invade their territories before reaching a truce with Sinan.

The conspirators had to ensure Saladin's brother Turan-Shah, a capable general, was absent. In 1173, Turan-Shah was sent to Upper Egypt to quell unrest from former Fatimid soldiers and counter raids by the Nubian kingdom of Makuria. In 1174, he sailed to Arabia to take over former Fatimid territories in the Hejaz, including Mecca and Medina, and Yemen. This removed a potential rallying point for Ayyubid loyalists in the event of Saladin's death. Some accounts suggest Umara encouraged Turan-Shah to pursue distant conquests, while others indicate Turan-Shah associated with several Fatimid figures who later fell victim to Saladin's crackdown.

The conspirators intended to restore the Fatimid regime, but disagreed on leadership: some favored al-Adid's oldest son, Dawud, while others preferred an adult cousin due to Dawud's minority. Similarly, the vizierate was contested among descendants of former viziers Shawar and Tala'i ibn Ruzzik. Despite favorable conditions in 1173 with Saladin on campaign and Turan-Shah occupied in Upper Egypt, the conspirators hesitated, likely due to King Amalric's inaction.

The conspiracy was ultimately betrayed, though sources differ on the informant. Possible suspects include Najm al-Din ibn Masal, son of a former vizier, the Crusader envoy George, inadvertently through a Christian agent of Saladin's, or the preacher Zayn al-Din Ali ibn Naja, who reportedly requested confiscated property as a reward. Another account suggests Zayn al-Din's investigation of Abd al-Samad led to the plot's discovery. Imad al-Din claims Saladin's agents had infiltrated the conspiracy, keeping him informed long before the crackdown.

On March 31, 1174, Saladin arrested the conspiracy leaders. Some confessed freely, others under duress. Seeking a religious ruling (fatwa) on their fate, the verdict was death. Starting April 6 with Umara and ending May 23 with Ibn Kamil al-Mufaddal, they were publicly executed and crucified in Bayn al-Qasrayn, Cairo's main square between the Fatimid Great Palaces. Remaining conspirators were exiled to Upper Egypt or branded traitors. Shortly after, a Sicilian fleet unsuccessfully attacked Alexandria, which historian Ibn al-Athir links to the conspiracy, suggesting Amalric refrained from action, but the Sicilians were unaware of events in Cairo.

Historical Assessment

The official account of the conspiracy, as detailed by Qadi al-Fadil and echoed by subsequent sources, has faced scrutiny from modern historians. While historian Heinz Halm largely accepts the narrative, Andrew Ehrenkreutz's 1972 biography of Saladin suggests the plot was genuine but Turan-Shah's deployment to Yemen strategically removed him from Cairo, preventing him from protecting his associates. Historians M.C. Lyons and D.E.P. Jackson concur that Saladin encouraged Turan-Shah's expedition to suit broader political aims, while dismissing Umara's influence as exaggerated.

Sources

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